

Air War

1. Note: studies concluding that the bombing campaign had had NO USEFUL EFFECT

NIE'S , INR

SA

JASON 1966, 67

SEACABIN

NSSM-1 (incl. Pass)

OPMs

McN memo

vs.

JCS

USAF

MACV

CINCPAC

Postwar

[Note: Congress, public, never told these conclusions.]
LBJ views?

- 12 Morale effect: at best, illustrates VFK "small drink" metaphor.

Refusal to draw lessons of history on

(a) Intimidation

(b) Morale effects of bombing.

(BPM)

(RAND Failure)

2. How bad is the war?

How outrageous? How compelling to oppose it?

Attitudes on war

Von Knecht: Worst thing a gov can do is

to get country into the wrong war.

Federalist Papers.

3. Studies show: [all concealed]

(a) Pers. NIES

(b) JCS demands: Troops (1961-62)
bombing...

(c) Covert ops

(d) Studies of bombing: no effect.

(e) Willingness to intervene with GVN;
yet inhibitions, unwillingness to use leverage

(f) e.g. Diem coup (vs. US role in 1954-55)

(g) Awareness of pop. support for Ho: 1946-54

(h) " Ho would win election in South, 1954-56

(i) " of shortcomings of Diem regime, lack of
pop. support.

(j) Lack of ^{officials'} awareness, interest in:

History

VC/DRV

Civilian Casualties

actual impact on society

appeal, promise of VC

(k) Unwillingness to negotiate, compromise

(l) Conscious goals: deny to Coms; avoid humiliation, failure;

(m) Internal emphasis on dominoes; contradicted by Ruff

(n) Ball on war; McN after 1966;

→ - Failure to learn, from history or US experience, about psac.

(P) JCS reliance on NSAM 288 - & implications instead of: LBJ, John Napier April 7, 65:

"Our objective is the independence of SVN and its freedom from attack - We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people of SVN be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."

(See JCS reaction to May 19-67 McN OPM)

(Q) Manipulation, deception (corruptions, aduressing)

attitude of Exps towards Congress, public, w.r.t: goals, prospects, results, alternatives, programs.

(R) Adm leaders as ignorant, arrogant fools. Unwisdom; inhumanity.

RAND Failures: - Study bombing: analysis, prediction.

- Lessons from history on intervention, ^{morale} (despite Able, Whiskeybifur)

(Note Speer: NVN also increased growth rate in 1965-66).

How much were military attitudes on bombing
& powers determined by desire to have
a base for expanded, all-out bombing?

Or, from this would be precluded by limits
on power or negot?

(Thus, false option on current
bombing, to keep it going?)

(Or other reasons: post-war roles
& budgets ; or...?)

Military measured "value" in terms of
physical effects: destruction, problems, --

^{year-end summary}
West, Jan 67: bombing "indispensable" in
maintaining the morale of his forces!

(dispatched 4 days before Jet off.)

Contrast McN to Congress, 1 Feb 68

Total aid:

1965 420 M

66 730

67 1000

See mil aid: defense

— Lesson of Jet on the bombing was unequivocal.

On bombing:

pop., docks, transport

- Punitive, disruptive effects of all-out bombing not tested. Likewise, "sharp knock."
(But experience supported intell ests of dubious effect).

Little "disruption, industrial targets": electric, POC, plants: no effect.

- Total interdiction not tested

(But intell ests very unequivocal on this;
✓ otherwise supported.)

- For what was done: (a) no useful effect

(b) Pers. ests confirmed.

+ WWR, also

(c) military ests totally discredited

(even though they did not claim visible effects would be decisive).

- thus, support for analyses concluding:

- no bombing campaign could achieve flow,
or win.

- no good effect from closing Haiphong